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I INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the new millennium, technology is progressing at a remarkable rate 
in the area of video surveillance. 1 Consequently, people are now subject to surveillance 
not only in public areas, but also in private places such as their own home.2 This paper 
considers such home video surveillance a possible invasion of privacy.
3 
Although video surveillance is recent, invasion of pnvacy has long been an issue 
addressed by academics. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis formulated an insightful 
argument in 1890 when they stated: 
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten 
to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops. ' 4 
Today, however, surveillance technology has even greater potential to intrude into New 
Zealanders' homes. The most common instrument used for such intrusion is the video 
camera, and there have been four main advances in this area. Firstly, digitisation of 
camera recorded images has developed. This allows for easier replication and the more 
efficient exchange of the image and hence, more people can use the video camera and 
copy images without specialist knowledge. In addition, the ease of passing on images in 
digital form has made them available to a wider audience. Secondly, there have been 
1 "To video" involves both the recording and the showing of the captured image (Collins Compact English 
Dictionary (3 ed, HarperCollins Publishers, Wrotham, 1994) 988). "Surveillance" means the observation of 
a person ( Collins Compact English Dictionary, above n 1, 884). Therefore, this paper refers to video 
surveillance as observing a person by either the recording or viewing of a captured image. This paper also 
proceeds on the basis that what the video surveillance captures will be watched. 
- The Collins Compact English Dictionary, above n 1, 400 defines the home as the place where someone 
lives. Although very wide, this paper proposes to adopt the same definition. More specifically, however, 
this paper will refer to the home as including both the inside and outside property. 
3 See: Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421,428,433; William L Prosser 
"Privacy [a legal analysis]" in Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An 
Anthology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) 104, 107 . 
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advances in miniaturisation, resulting in cameras being so small that people can put them 
in virtually any place without someone detecting the equipment. This, and reduced prices, 
has meant that people are using miniature video cameras at an increasing rate. 5 Thirdly, 
today's surveillance cameras also have powerful zoom lenses, which means that from far 
away people can obtain clear images of another's private activities. Finally, cameras now 
have infrared capabilities. Therefore, cameras can now clearly watch and record 
someone's private activities at night. 6 These developments have meant that video 
surveillance is now one of the best methods to invade someone's home. 7 
In my opinion, this technology threatens to fulfill Warren and Brandeis' prediction by 
virtue of New Zealand law having no clear and simple prohibition or regulation relating 
to home video surveillance. This paper, however, explains New Zealand's existing law 
and suggests a solution to the problem . 
Part II of this paper discusses whether the public even needs legal protection from home 
video surveillance and then considers the legal routes currently available. This part 
separates these laws into two sections: common law and legislation. Part III then 
discusses which body, Parliament or the judiciary, is more equipped to deal with the 
problem of home video surveillance. In addition, Part III also suggests an extension to 
New Zealand's law that would cover home video surveillance and, in doing so, this paper 
reviews the United State's tort of intrusion upon solitude. Overall, this paper advocates 
the view that current New Zealand law does not sufficiently deal with the problem of 
home video surveillance. In my opinion, Parliament should pass broad legislation relating 
to this issue, thereby providing the courts with enough scope to deal with this , and future, 
video surveillance problems . 
4 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193, 195 . 
5 Christopher S Milligan "Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy" (winter, 1999) 
9 S Cal IntDiscp L J 295, 303. 
6 Bruce Philips "Privacy in a Surveillance Society" (1997) 46 U NB L J 127, 129 . 
7 The above discussion is merely a brief background of the video surveillance technology available which 
is directly applicable to this paper. For example, there is also facial recognition technology and aerial 
thermal imaging technology. For a good overview of the technology see: Milligan, above n 5, 295 . 
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II EXISTING PROTECTION 
This part first analyses whether the public does need protection from home video 
surveillance and then discusses the common law and legislation that may already 
sufficiently protect New Zealanders . 
A The Need for Protection 
There is much evidence suggesting that privacy is a fundamental right in today's society. 
Firstly, people commonly define privacy as the right to be left alone,8 and, as Alan 
Westin explains, privacy is more than simply a human desire, "but arises in the biological 
and social processes of all life."9 In addition, privacy is a necessity in modem life 
because it is essential to each person's individuality and the right to control their own 
lives. Charles Fried has also linked privacy to friendship, love, trust and respect. 10 This 
indicates that people need, and recognise, privacy as an important iight. 11 
There is also evidence that privacy has obtained the status of a human right. Article 12 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, to which New Zealand is a signatory, 
states: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 12 
8 Warren and Brandeis, above n 4, 195; Judith Jarvis Thomson "The Right to Privacy" in Ferdinand D 
Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: A11 A11thology (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984) 272. Emphasis added. 
9 Alan Westin Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head, London, 1970) 11. 
'° Charles Fried "Privacy [a moral analysis]" in Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy: An A11thology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) 203,205 . 
11 Harry Kalven , Jr. "Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?" (1966) 31 L & Contemp 
Probs 326 . 
12 General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), G.A.0.R., 3rd Session, Part I, 71 . 
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6 
Article 12 embraces all aspects of privacy and shows that privacy is a basic right that all 
people should have. 13 In addition, Parliament passed the Privacy Act in 1993 in order to 
"promote and protect individual privacy" 14 and, more recently, Nicholson J expressly 
accepted that a right of privacy does exist. 15 Privacy therefore, is a recognised right 
belonging to individuals in New Zealand . 
Since privacy is a right, the next issue is whether home video surveillance infringes this 
right. One important element of privacy is an individual's right to be alone or with a 
specific group of people without outside interference; this is the right to seclusion or 
solitude. 16 Home video surveillance, however, clearly violates this aspect of privacy . 
Once in the home, people are usually exercising their right to seclusion or solitude . 
Someone's use of video surveillance to watch or record what occurs in that home, 
however, invades this right. In effect, an outsider is invading this person's private life, 
and this is an obvious form of privacy invasion. 17 Home video surveillance therefore, is 
an infringement of privacy . 
Overall, technological advancements have meant that people in today's society are more 
likely to use video surveillance to invade another's home, and cases have shown that this 
occurs in New Zealand. 18 Therefore, since it infringes privacy, home video surveillance is 
a problem which New Zealand law must address . 
13 Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 contains a similar protection 
of privacy. New Zealand is also a signatory to this treaty . 
14 Privacy Act 1993 Title . 
15 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 601. Nicholson J, however, did limit this to the facts of the case, which was 
the public disclosure of private facts. 
16 Prosser, above n 3, 107; Gavison, above n 3, 428. 
17 James Rachels "Why Privacy is Important" in Ferdinand D Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) 290; Gavison, above n 3, 433; 
Prosser, above n 3, 108 . 
18 
For examples see: R v Gardiner [1997] BCL 1144 (HC); Marris v TV3 Network Ltd (14 October 1991) 
unreported , High Court, Wellington, CP 754/91; TV3 Network Services Ltd v Broadcasting Standards 
Authority [1995] 2 NZLR 720 (HC). 
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B Common Law 
Under this heading, this paper discusses trespass to land, private nuisance and privacy as 
possible existing common law prohibitions on home video surveillance. 
1 Trespass to land 
The tort of trespass to land protects the person in possess10n of the land from any 
unjustifiable or unlawful interference with that person's right of possession.
19 If someone 
wanted to use this tort to remedy home video surveillance, however, a number of issues 
arise. Firstly, the person invoking the tort must be in possession of the land and therefore 
this tort will not be available to someone with a mere licensee interest.
20 Generally, 
however, someone subjected to video surveillance while in his or her home will satisfy 
this element. 21 
Secondly, the courts usually only apply this tort to acts that physically interfere with 
someone's possession. Therefore, trespass to land will only apply if someone actually 
enters another's area of possession. 22 Nevertheless, the courts have applied this tort in 
video surveillance cases when the defendant has also committed a physical trespass.2
3 
The courts, however, were only willing to remedy the physical entry into the plaintiffs' 
private property, not the act of video surveillance. 
24 In addition to this, video surveillance 
19 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 ST TR 1030; Stephen Todd The Laws of New Zealand: Tort 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1994) 144. 
20 Todd, above n 19, 144; John G Fleming The Law of Torts (8 ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, Australia, 
1992) 603. Note also that Hunter v Canary Wha,f Ltd [1997] AC 655 (HL), although directly concerned 
with nuisance, may also be relevant to trespass to land. 
21 However, if someone is the subject of video surveillance in a hotel room, or a hospital room, they will 
not gain a remedy under this tort. See: Kaye v Robertson (1990) IPR 147 (CA) (hospital patient); Bradley v 
Wingnut Films Ltd [ 1993) I NZLR 415, 429 (HC) (mentioning a lodger) . 
22 Fleming, above n 20,603; Lil!coln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willessee (1986) 4 NSWLR 460. 
23 Marris, above n 18, 754/91; Lincoln Hunt, above n 22,457 . 
24 The danger, however, is that the courts may be indirectly providing the plaintiffs with damages under this 
tort. In Marris and Lincoln Hunt the court suggested that exemplary damages may be appropriate (Marris, 
above n 18, 15 ; Lincoln Hullt, above n 22, 464, 465). If the court did grant exemplary damages in these 
cases, the courts may be providing the plaintiffs with reparation for both the video surveillance and the 
physical trespass. This is because in my opinion, neither of these trespass situations justified punishing the 
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technology has advanced to the stage where it is not even necessary for any physical 
trespass to occur. The development of powerful zoom lenses and infrared vision has 
meant that someone could obtain a clear picture of someone in their home without the 
camera being near their area of possession . 
Another major problem with someone relying upon trespass to land to obtain a remedy 
for home video surveillance is that this tort is land-based. More specifically, trespass to 
land aims at remedying unlawful intrusions upon someone's property.
25 In theory, 
therefore, there are no situations where this tort should remedy home video surveillance. 
This is because video surveillance never physically intrudes upon the land, but at most, it 
interferes in an abstract sense with someone's right of seclusion . 
Nevertheless, some may argue that the courts should extend trespass to land beyond acts 
that only physically interfere with someone's area of possession. Any such judicial 
reformulation of this tort, however, would undermine over 200 years of common law and 
it is unlikely that the courts would do this to provide a remedy for home video 
surveillance. Lord Camden in Entick v Carrington stated that "the eye cannot by the laws 
of England be guilty of a trespass"26 and courts have also stated that someone does not 
trespass by photographing,27 or disclosing what they see. 28 In addition, the comts would 
not reformulate trespass to land in this way because, since this tort is land-based, the 
courts will only base an extension of the tort on harm to the plaintiff's land. As already 
stated, however, video surveillance does not physically harm the land. The problem of 
home video surveil lance therefore, is no reason for the courts to extend this tort. 
Under trespass to land, the plaintiff must have possession of the private space upon which 
the video surveillance is intruding. Although the plaintiff will usually satisfy this, the 
major problems are that the courts have only used this tort to remedy instances of actual 
defendants further with exemplary damages. This, however, is only a personal view, and the courts never 
stated they would provide damages for the surveillance. 
25 Todd, above n 19, 144. 
26 Entick v Carrington, above n 19, 1066 (obiter dicta). 
27 
Sports and General Press Agency Ltd v "Our Dogs" Publishing Co Ltd [1916] 2 KB 880. 
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physical trespass and this tort is land-based. Trespass to land therefore, does not protect 
the public from home video surveillance . 
2 Private nuisance 
A private nuisance occurs when someone interferes unreasonably with another's land.
29 
At first, it seems arguable that this tort will protect people from home video surveillance . 
There are, however, a number of hurdles with using this tort. The first is similar to 
trespass to land in that only the person having a right in the private land that another is 
invading can claim private nuisance. 30 Usually this will only include a person with a 
freehold interest, a tenant or a licensee with exclusive possession. As with trespass to 
land therefore, the tort of private nuisance is not available to a person with only a licensee 
interest. 31 
Secondly, if the video surveillance is only temporary and does not cause any actual 
physical damage to the land, it may not be a nuisance.32 It is difficult to determine for 
what time the surveillance must continue to constitute a nuisance. As a general 
proposition, however, someone would have to conduct the surveillance on enough 
occasions, or for such a time-period, as to be offensive to a reasonable person. 33 
The third issue is whether the courts have classified video surveillance as a nuisance . 
Traditionally the courts have separated their analysis of nuisances into those causing 
actual physical damage to the land and those that only cause abstract damage: such as 
28 Victoria Park a11d Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479. 
29 See: William C Hodge, Bill Atkin, Geoff McLay and Bruce Pardy Torts in New Zealand: Cases and 
Materials (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 423. 
30 C anary Wharf, above n 20, 692. But see: Cana,y Wha,f, above n 20, 712-719 per Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon dissenting. Lord Cooke provides a thorough and reasoned judgement concerning whether 
spouses, children or lodgers could sue in nuisance. Lord Cooke states at page 717 that the "preponderance 
of academic opinion seems also to be against confining the right to sue in nuisance for interference with 
amenities to plaintiffs with proprietary interests in the land." Although a dissenting judgement in an 
English case, Lord Cooke's judgement could be valuable to the development of New Zealand law, given 
his background and influence. 
31 Canary Wharf, above 20,692. Contrast: Khorasa11djian v Bush [1993) QB 727. 
32 S ee: Hodge and others, above n 29,423; Halsey v Essa Petroleum Co Ltd [1961) 1 WLR 683. 
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10 
annoyance or discomfort. If the nuisance causes actual damage, the courts will presume 
that it is unreasonable. In extreme situations, home video survei11ance may cause actual 
physical damage. This could occur when someone enters the home and damages it while 
either installing or conducting the video surveillance. If this transpired the court would 
provide redress, but they would only remedy the physical damage, not the surveillance. 
The more likely scenario is that home video surveillance will cause abstract damage in 
which case the court must also find that it was unreasonable. 34 Traditionally, however, 
the courts have not been willing to define intrusion into someone's private life as a 
nuisance. 35 In Bemstein of Leigh (Baron) v Skyviews & General Ltd Griffiths J stated that 
there "is no law against taking a photograph,"36 and the Australian High Court in Victoria 
Park Racing Co v Taylor found that there is no law prohibiting someone from observing 
races from an outside platform. 37 
These cases show that private nuisance is unlikely to prohibit home video surveillance . 
This is because com1s distinguish between things that emanate from somewhere, such as 
noise, and those that do not; the latter not being a nuisance. 38 An example of something 
that does not emanate from somewhere would be video surveillance. Such surveillance 
only observes and records what is occun-ing upon someone's land, and therefore, nothing 
physical or otherwise interferes with that person's property . 
John Fleming, however, argues that certain conduct, with no social value, that interferes 
with someone's use and enjoyment of their land may be a nuisance. 39 If con-ect, this 
proposition means that the courts would define home video surveillance as a nuisance in 
33 Fleming, above n 20, 604. 
34 Hodge and others, above n 29, 423 . 
35 Fleming, above n 20, 603. 
36 
Bernsreill of Leigh ( Baron) v Sky views & General Ltd [ 1978] QB 479, 488 . 
37 Vicroria Park, above n 28, 479. 
38 
Callary Wha,f, above n 20, 685-686, 708-709. Lord Goff of Chieveley raises the case of Bank of New 
Zeala1Zd v Greenwood [1984] l NZLR 525. In this case, the court decided that reflected sunrays constituted 
a nuisance. As Lord Goff explains, one should also interpret the sunrays as emanating from somewhere. 
39 Fleming, above n 20, 604. 
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extreme circumstances. 40 There are reasons, however, why the courts should not define 
extreme cases of video surveillance laclcing social utility as instances of private nuisance . 
Firstly, the courts would have to decide in each case whether the video surveillance was 
intrusive enough to justify using private nuisance, and whether the surveillance had a 
legitimate purpose. This would mean that neither defendant nor plaintiff would have any 
firm idea concerning whether the courts would define their situation of home video 
surveillance as a private nuisance . 
Secondly, the purpose of private nuisance is to prohibit intrusions onto someone's land . 
With modem video surveillance however, generally no physical intrusion occurs. 
Although video surveillance can record what occurs in private places, it does not 
physically intrude upon the home in the same way as smell, smoke or even sound 
waves. 41 
Finally, as with trespass , nuisance is a land-based tort. Courts therefore, will proceed with 
nuisance based on a interference with the land. Although one could argue that home 
video surveillance interferes with the enjoyment of the land, in essence the surveillance 
has not as much to do with the land as it does with the intangible right of privacy. In 
addition, if the courts were to remedy p1ivacy invasions with a land-based tort, they 
would be mistakenly defining privacy as a right that goes with the land instead of one that 
travels with the person . 
Overall, under private nuisance, the plaintiff must have a right in the land, and if no 
actual physical damage occurs, the plaintiff must show the interference was 
unreasonable. In addition, if the person was abnormally sensitive to the nuisance the 
court will not grant them a remedy.42 Regardless, the likely view is that the courts will 
40 
Note also that if video surveillance is a nuisance and someone moves into a house that has always been 
the subject of surveillance, the court may still grant him or her a remedy. See: Miller v Jackson [1977] 3 
All ER 338 per Geoffrey Lane LJ (Cumming-Bruce LJ concurring). 
41 S ee generally: Halsey, above n 32, 683 . 
42 Robinson v Kil vert ( 1889) 41 Chd 88. 
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not class home video surveillance as a private nuisance. This tort therefore, does not 
provide the public with any certain protection . 
3 Privacy 
In P v D the High Court recently confirmed the existence of a privacy tort in New 
Zealand. The court formulated the tort under four parts: (a) the information must be a 
private fact; (b) the publication must be a public disclosure; (c) the disclosure must be 
highly offensive and objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the plaintiff's 
position; and (d) the court must have regard to the nature and extent of the legitimate 
public interest in disclosure.43 
Home video surveillance would usually capture private facts and any disclosure would 
generally satisfy the highly offensive test. In addition, many of these disclosures would 
probably not be matters of legitimate public interest under (d). 44 Nevertheless, this tort 
does little to remedy situations of home video surveillance since the person using the 
video surveillance must publicly disclose what the equipment has recorded.45 The only 
common situation, however, where private information obtained through video 
surveillance would certainly be publicly disclosed is when the news media are using the 
surveillance. In addition, even if someone gains a remedy under the P v D expression, the 
tort punishes the disclosure, not the actual intrusion the video surveillance has committed . 
Since the P v D formulation is the only clearly accepted expression of the p1ivacy tort in 
New Zealand,46 it is reasonable to state that this current tort fmmulation does not prohibit 
home video surveillance . 
43 P v D, above n 15,591,601. 
44 In order to satisfy the public interest test the information disclosed must be a matter of public concern 
rather than something in which the public has an interest. Clearly in some situations disclosure of what 
home video surveillance captures will be in the public interest, especially when it relates to crime and 
national security (John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Oxford University 
Press , Auckland, 1999) 175) . 
45 The exact meaning of public disclosure is uncertain. It may be similar to defamation in that publication to 
one person would be enough, but, in my opinion, wider disclosure is probably required (Burrows and 
Cheer, above n 44, 175. 
46 But see: Rosemary Tobin "The New Zealand Tort of Invasion of Privacy" (2000) 5 Tolley's Comm L 
129, 133. 
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C Legislation 
This section discusses the Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principles, the 
Harassment Act 1997, the Privacy Act 1993 and the Brn of Rights Act 1990 . 
1 Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principles 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) has developed a number of privacy 
principles that all broadcasters should follow .47 Principle III, however, is the only 
principle directly applicable to home video surveillance. Principle III provides a ground 
for complaint when there is: 
Intentional interference (in the nature of prying) with an individual's interest in 
solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be offensive to the ordinary person but 
an individual's interest in solitude or seclusion does not provide the basis for a 
privacy action for an individual to complain about being observed or followed or 
photographed in a public place . 
Provided someone intentionally interferes with another's seclusion or solitude, the BSA 
should provide the plaintiff with redress under this principle. If one applies this to home 
video surveillance, it is apparent that this principle should remedy such conduct. Once in 
the home, someone is clearly within his or her zone of seclusion and the use of video 
surveillance would be an intentional intrusion upon this area. 48 In addition, the BSA 
commonly uses this principle to remedy cases where someone has not consented to video 
recording and filming. 49 This shows that, when not consented to, video surveillance is 
both an intentional interference and offensive to a reasonable person. Therefore, this 
47 Although not strictly legislation, the BSA does gain its authority to deal with privacy complaints under 
the principles from the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
48 TV3 v BSA , above n 18, 733 . 
49 Burrows and Cheer, above n 44, 182. 
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principle seemingly prohibits home video surveillance. Unfortunately, however, this is 
not the case . 
As stated previously, new surveillance technology means someone using such equipment 
will not have to enter the subject's home. This was a problem with trespass, and it is also 
an obstacle with principle III. If a broadcaster is operating the surveillance from a public 
place, or their own private area, they will not be breaching principle III. 50 Authority for 
this comes from TV3 v BSA when the judge decided that surreptitious filming from 
outside the plaintiff's land was not unlawful and, therefore, the crew did not breach 
principle III. The only time TV3 breached this principle was when they publicly 
disclosed what the camera recorded,5 1 but the actual video surveillance was not a breach . 
This means home video surveillance will only breach principle III if the broadcaster 
physically enters the private area, or subsequently discloses what they recorded in a way 
that is offensive to an ordinary person. 52 This, and the fact the principles only apply to 
radio and television media, severely limits the ability of principle III to remedy instances 
of home video surveillance. Overall therefore, principle III clearly does not provide New 
Zealanders with much protection from home video surveillance . 
2 Harassment Act 1997 
The New Zealand Harassment Act came into force in 1998 and provides for civil and 
criminal forms of harassment. 53 The first problem with defining home video surveillance 
50 Burrows and Cheer, above n 44, 183. 
51 TV3 v BSA, above n 18, 732, 733 . 
52 Principle III; TV3 v BSA, above n 18, 733. 
53 Harassment Act 1997, Part 2 & Part 3. This Part will not consider criminal harassment in detail because, 
in addition to the requirements of civil harassment, one must also satisfy section 8(1). Section 8(1) states 
that the accused must intend to cause the subject to fear for their own or their family's safety, or know the 
harassment will cause the subject to fear for their own or their family's safety. In my opinion, although it 
will depend on each case, the courts would find it difficult to impute the accused with either intent or 
knowledge. This is because people generally use video survei llance to obtain private information about 
someone, not to make that person fear for their safety. In addition, the person using the surveillance would 
usually want their activities to remain secret, and therefore would probably not intend or even know that 
their actions would cause the subject to fear for their safety. A similar provision is s 2l(d) of the Summary 
Offences Act 1981 (substituted previous s21 in 1998). This section states that if someone intends, or knows 
their watching of another's home will frighten or intimidate that person they will be liable for either 3 
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as a form of harassment is that there is very little legal authority relating to this Act. 
Nevertheless, the relevant sections state: 
3. Meaning of "harassment" -( l) For the purposes of this Act, a person 
harasses another person if he or she engages in a pattern of behaviour that is 
directed against that other person, being a pattern of behaviour that includes 
doing any specified act to the other person on at least 2 separate occasions within 
a period of 12 months . 
4. Meaning of "specified act"-(1) For the purposes of this Act, a specified act, 
in relation to a person, means any of the following acts: 
(a) Watching, loitering near, or preventing or hindering access to or from, that 
person's place of residence, business, employment, or any other pl~ce that 
the person frequents for any purpose: 
(f) Acting in any other way-
(i) That causes that person ("person A") to fear for his or her safety; 
and 
(ii) That would cause a reasonable person in person A's particular 
circumstances to fear for his or her safety . 
Consequently, the first element of civil harassment is that the accused must be engaging 
in a pattern of behaviour. 54 Section 3(1) provides that a pattern of behaviour occurs when 
a person does "any specified act to the other person on at least 2 separate 
occasions ... within 12 months." The issue, therefore, is whether home video surveillance 
is a specified act. 
months imprisonment or a $2,000 fine under s21(3). This section raises the same problematic issues of 
intent and knowledge. Section 30 of the Summary Offences Act also states that someone is liable for a 
$500 fine if they peep or peer into someone's home at night: night being from one hour after sunset to one 
hour before sunrise. Problems, however, are that this section will not protect someone from home video 
surveillance during the day, and it is uncertain whether video surveillance can be included within the 
definition of peeping or peering. In addition, $500 is not a very substantial penalty. 
54 Harassment Act 1997, s3(l). 
... • 
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Under section 4(1)(a) someone watching another's home is a specified act. The 
Harassment Act does not define watching, but the common definition is "to look at or 
observe closely and attentively."55 Given this definition, it is clear that video surveillance 
could be a form of watching as long as someone actually observes the private acts using 
the video surveillance. In addition, it should make no difference if someone watches the 
acts as they occur, or whether they watch the recording later. In effect, they are still 
observing the private acts closely and attentively . 
Another issue is whether the acts of "loitering ... preventing or hindering" colour the 
meaning of watching. 56 One could argue that someone can do these acts without 
technological instruments and therefore the term "watching" does not include observing 
someone with video surveillance equipment. In my opinion, however, someone will 
commonly use other instruments when conducting all these acts. For example, person A 
may prevent person B from leaving their home by aiming a rifle at their front door. Here 
person A is clearly using a foreign instrument to prevent person B from leaving his or her 
place of residence. Therefore, there is no reason why the acts of loitering, preventing or 
hindering should exclude observing with video surveillance equipment from the meaning 
of watching . 
Given this conclusion, home video surveillance will be a pattern of behaviour if the 
plaintiff can show that the defendant has directed the video surveillance against them,57 
and did so on two or more separate occasions within twelve months.58 If the above 
55 Collins Compact English Dictionary, above n 1, l OOO . 
-6 
) Harassment Act 1997, s4(l)(a) . 
57 Harassment Act 1997, s3(1).Therefore, if someone is directing the surveillance against person A, but 
person B is captured by the surveillance twice within twelve months, only person A can invoke the 
Harassment Act. In addition, if someone directs the surveillance against no one, then the surveillance is not 
a form of harassment. Nevertheless, commonly the person using the Act will be the subject of the 
surveil I a nee. 
58 Harassment Act 1997, s3(1 ). It is not entirely clear whether the Harassment Act would class continuous 
surveillance as occurring on two or more occasions under section 3(1) and there is no case law relating 
directly to the interpretation of "separate occasions". Under section 6(b), however, the aim of this Act is to 
provide people with adequate legal protection from harassment. It would seem absurd for the Act to 
prohibit person A from following person Bon Mondays and Thursdays, which would clearly be harassment 
(see: Harassment Act 1997, ss 3 & 4(b)) but not person A following person B for twelve months 
.. • .--,. 
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analysis is incorrect, however, providing the video surveillance caused the plaintiff to 
fear for his or her safety and this fear was reasonable in the circumstances, the video 
surveillance will constitute a specified act.59 
From the above analysis, home video surveillance is likely to constitute civil harassment 
under the Act and therefore the court may grant a restraining order. 60 In my opinion, 
however, this Act still does not provide enough protection. There are three reasons for 
this view. Firstly, this Act aims at punishing individuals for harassing other individuals . 
In some situations, however, certain agencies, such as Crown agencies61 or private 
detective organisations,62 will employ video surveillance. Although the courts may 
punish some individuals in these agencies, the organisation itself will probably escape 
any liability . 
Secondly, the person seeking to invoke the Act must prove that the specified act has 
occurred more than once in twelve months. This means that if the person using the 
surveillance knows that the subject has detected them, he or she has an opportunity to 
either stop the surveillance or make it less detectable. Conversely the subject has had 
their p1ivate life invaded, but has no remedy under this Act. 
Finally, the Act's punishments do not remedy the privacy invasion. Although the court 
may grant a restraining order against the person, this does not address the actual invasion 
into the subject's private area. It may stop, or deter future home video surveillance, but 
continuously. Common sense therefore, would suggest that the courts would interpret continuous 
surveillance as occurring on two separate occasions under s3. 
59 Harassment Act 1997, s4(l)(f). Note also that fear for safety includes a fear for mental safety 
(Harassment Act 1997, s2(1)). 
60 Harassment Act 1997, s9 . 
61 Harassment Act 1997, s7, this Act binds the Crown. 
62 There is, however, the Private Investigators and Security Guards Act 1974, which applies directly to 
private investigators. Section 52, although somewhat dated, makes it an offence against this Act for a 
private investigator to take a videotape recording of another person without the prior written consent of that 
person. If the private investigator breaches this section, under s57 the Registrar may suspend, cancel or 
reprimand the investigator's license or fine them $500. The main problem with this Act is that it only 
applies to private investigators, and this is defined narrowly in s3. More specifically, s3(4)(a) provides that 
someone is not a private investigator because they seek information for the Crown, the Police or the news 
r:a 
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under this Act, the courts cannot compensate the victim for any damage that has already 
occurred. In my opinion therefore, the Harassment Act does not adequately protect New 
Zealanders from home video surveillance . 
3 Privacy Act 1993 
Parliament passed the Privacy Act in 1993 and the Act set up a Privacy Commissioner 
together with a means for the Complaints Review Tribunal to remedy privacy breaches.63 
In addition, this Act also formulated twelve information privacy principles,64 but only one 
is directly relevant to home video surveillance.65 Principle 4 states: 
Personal information shall not be collected by an agency-
(a) By unlawful means; or 
(b) By means that, in the circumstances of the case, -
(i) Are unfair; or 
(ii) Intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the 
individual concerned . 
Home video surveillance would clearly involve obtaining personal info1mation,66 and 
anyone using video surveillance would be an agency. 67 The first issue therefore, is 
media. In addition, the fine of $500 is far too low to be an effective remedy or deterrent against home video 
surveillance. 
63 Privacy Act 1993, Part III & Part VIII. 
64 Privacy Act 1993, Part II . 
65 Principle l does not apply because there is no clear evidence that video surveillance of private places is 
unlawful under Principle !(a) (See: Marris, above n 18, 13). Video surveillance also would not breach 
Principle 2( !) because in effect the person is collecting the information directly from the surveillance 
subject. Nor would it breach Principle 3 because under Principle 3(4)(e), compliance would not be 
reasonably practicable. 
66 Privacy Act 1993, s2 defines personal information as " information about an identifiable individual". Any 
video surveillance of someone's private area would be about this individual, and therefore, personal 
information. 
67 Privacy Act 1993, s2 defines an agency as "any person or body of persons, whether corporate or 
unincorporate, and whether in the public sector or the private sector." This wide definition clearly includes 
anyone that would decide to use video surveillance. 
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whether someone using home video surveillance collects the personal information, which 
under section 2 "does not include the receipt of unsolicited information.". 68 
A situation similar to home video surveillance arose in Harder v Proceedings 
Commissioner.69 The defendant received a telephone call from the plaintiff and recorded 
the conversation. Counsel for the defendant argued the call was unsolicited, but both the 
Complaints Review Tribunal and the High Court rejected this on the basis that the 
defendant became an active recipient of the information by turning on the recorder. 70 The 
Court of Appeal, however, overruled these decisions because the "unsolicited nature of 
the information was not affected by the fact that it was recorded or the way it was 
recorded."7 1 This decision, if correct, would seem to mean that someone using home 
video surveillance would not be collecting personal information under this Act. The 
reason being that, the person using the surveillance did not specifically ask for the 
personal information and, under Harder, the fact that the surveillance is actively 
recording the information does not change its unsolicited nature . 
In my opinion , however, home video surveillance will be a form of collection. The reason 
for this is that information is only unsolicited if someone actively gives or sends the 
information to another person.72 In the case of home video surveillance, however, the 
subject generally never actively or knowingly gives personal information to the 
survei !lance operator. The information is solicited; therefore, since surveillance 
equipment is a collecting device, the person operating the video surveillance collects it 
under principle 4 . 
68 The Collins Compact English Dictionary, above n 1, 972 defines "unso licited info rmation" as someone 
~iving or sending in fo rmation to another person without him or her asking fo r it. 
9 Harder v Proceedings Com111issio11er (13 August 1999) unreported, High Court, Auckland , AP 65SW/99. 
See al so : Proceedings Comll!issioner v Harder (28 May 1999) unreported , CRT, Decision No 14/99; 
Harder v Proceedings Commissioner [2000] 3 NZLR 80 (CA). 
70 Proceedings Commissioner v Harder, above n 69, 6. 
71 Harder v Proceedings Commissioner, above n 69, 91 (CA). 
72 
Collins Colllpact English Dictionary, above n 1, 972. See al so: Harder, above n 69, (CRT; HC; CA). 
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The next issue is whether home video surveillance will be unfair under principle 4(b)(i).73 
This will depend upon the circumstances of each case,74 but previous cases do provide 
some indication. The Court of Appeal in Harder found that the defendant's conduct was 
not unfair because the plaintiff should have anticipated that the defendant would make a 
full record of the conversation.75 Applying this reasoning to home video surveillance, 
generally someone would not expect to be the subject of video surveillance while in such 
a private place. Commonly therefore, this method of collecting personal information 
would be unfair. This conclusion accords with common sense in that, unless the subject 
did something to make it warranted, home video surveillance is not a very fair way to 
collect personal information. 
Conversely, if the video surveillance "intrude[s] to an unreasonable extent upon the 
personal affairs of the individual concerned" the video surveillance will also breach 
principle 4. 76 Again, whether the intrusion is unreasonable will depend on the 
circumstances,77 but the P1ivacy Commissioner's Case Note 0632, although not a legal 
precedent, provides a number of factors to consider. In this case, an employer was using 
video surveillance to monitor their employees. The Privacy Commissioner decided the 
employer was not intruding unreasonably upon the employees' personal affairs because 
they were not in a private place, the employer minimised the surveillance and they used 
the surveillance to uncover criminal activity.78 The situation, however, is much different 
with home video surveillance. The video surveillance is intruding on a private place and 
generally, it would defeat the purpose of the surveillance for the users to minimise its use . 
Home video surveillance therefore, will in certain circumstances be either unfair or 
intrude upon someone's personal affairs to an unreasonable extent. 
73 It is not clear whether video surveillance of private places is unlawful, therefore this paper will not deal 
with principle 4(a) . 
74 Privacy Act 1993, s6 principle 4(b). 
15 Harder (CA), above n 69, 92. 
76 Privacy Act 1993, s6 principle 4(b)(ii) 
77 Privacy Act 1993, s6 principle 4(b). 
78 Privacy Commissioner's Case Note 0632. 
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Provided the complainant can show they have had their privacy interfered with under 
section 66 and they have suffered some loss under section 88, the Complaints Review 
Tribunal may grant them damages. Principle 4 of the Privacy Act 1993 therefore, seems 
to provide reasonably good protection. There are, however, some serious shortcomings . 
Firstly, nothing in principle 4 applies to personal information that an intelligence 
organisation collects.79 These organisations are the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau. 80 These two 
organisations are likely to be among the most common users of video surveillance . 
Related to this first problem is the fact that a news medium is not an agency under the 
P1ivacy Act 1993 while carrying out its news activities,81 and hence not subject to 
principle 4. Therefore, If the news media are using home video surveillance in relation to 
their news activities, the victim will not be able to invoke principle 4 . 
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal and the Privacy Commissioner seem to suggest that if 
someone is collecting the personal information for a legitimate purpose, principle 4 will 
not apply. In Harder, this purpose was to have an accurate record and in Case Note 0632, 
the purpose was to detect c1ime. 82 This is a problem when one applies the legitimate 
purpose exception to different circumstances. For example, take the situation of a 
Neighbourhood Watch group attempting to prevent crime by setting up video 
surveillance around a suspected burglar's home. In this situation, the user of the 
surveillance may have a legitimate purpose for their actions. Namely, the Neighbourhood 
Watch group may be attempting to prevent crime. The point is that many people who use 
video surveillance may claim to have a legitimate reason for their actions, but they are 
still intruding upon someone's privacy. Due to case Jaw, however, the Privacy Act 1993 
will probably not provide the victim with a remedy. 
79 Privacy Act 1993, s57. 
80 Privacy Act 1993, s2. 
81 Privacy Act 1993, s2. 
82 
Harder (CA), above n 69 , 83; Case Note 0632, above n 78. 
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Due to these shortcomings, in my opinion the Privacy Act does not sufficiently protect 
the public from home video surveillance . 
4 Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) does provide the public with some degree of 
privacy protection . Section 21 states that "everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person , property, or correspondence or 
otherwise."83 The first point to note, however, is that section 3 limits the BORA's 
application : 
3. Application- This Bill or Rights applies only to acts done-
(a) By the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function , power, or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law . 
In relation to home video surveillance, section 3 would mean that the BORA only applies 
to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 84 Despite section 3, however, section 21 of 
the BORA may still protect someone from police or security agency surveillance . 
The first issue is whether home video surveillance would constitute a search. The case of 
R v Grayson and Taylor defines search as "an examination of a person or property."85 
This definition seems to include home video surveillance, but the courts have further 
complicated this issue. The courts have first done this by, when presented with relevant 
fact scenarios, declining to decide whether video surveillance constitutes a search.86 
83 BORA 1990, s2 l . 
84 
But see: R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] l NZLR 399 , 407 (CA). The court stated that so long as the r
5
overnment is involved somewhat in the act, this would satisfy s 3 of the BoRA. 
Grayson, above n 84, 406 . 
86 See: Grayson, above n 84, 399; R v Fraser [1997] 2 NZLR 442 (CA). 
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Secondly, the judicial comments that have emerged from the case law provide evidence 
for, and against, video surveillance being a search under section 21. Hardie Boys Jin R v 
Barlow87 stated that participant surveillance was probably not a search under section 21. 
In addition, at District Court level in R v Fraser the judge expressed serious doubts 
concerning whether the use of any video surveillance was a search.88 In my opinion, 
however, home video surveillance will be a search under section 21. Firstly, Gault J in 
Barlow stated that video surveillance could possibly be a search,89 and Casey Jin R v A90 
concluded that search or seizure should cover infringements of privacy by electronic 
listening devices. It would be reasonable to extend Casey J's reasoning to video 
surveillance. Secondly, in R v Gardiner the police subjected the accused to six months of 
video surveillance then used the information they gained to charge him with drug 
offenses. The High Court decided the video surveillance was a search because the police 
would not have gained the information without the surveillance, surveillance technology 
extended the meaning of search and the Court of Appeal tended to define search widely . 
In addition, the High Court in Gardiner believed the purpose of section 21 was to cover 
video surveillance. 91 This belief is supported by the White Paper A Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand (1985) when at paragraph 10.152 it states: "Article [21] should extend not only 
to the interception of mail, for example, but also to the electronic interception of private 
conversations, and other forms of surveillance." Overall, despite cloudy case law, in my 
opinion if someone approached the court with a situation concerning home video 
surveillance, the court would define this as a search under section 21 of the BORA . 
The next issue is whether the court will define the home video surveillance as an 
unreasonable search. 92 The first point to note is that the police or intelligence agency 
using the video surveillance will normally not be acting illegally. 93 Just because the 
surveillance is legal, however, does not automatically mean it is reasonable under section 
87 R v Barlow (1995) 14 CRNZ 9, 41 (CA). 
88 Fraser, above n 86,447 . 
89 Barlow, above n 87, 48, although he did not directly decide the issue. 
90 R v A [1994) l NZLR 429,440 (CA) . 
91 Gardiner, above n 18, 1144. 
92 BORA 1990, s21. 
93 Fraser, above n 86, 452. Unless of course they commit a trespass. 
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21.94 Overall, the search's reasonableness will depend upon the circumstances,95 but from 
the cases, the main factor was whether the police had good reason to believe they needed 
the surveillance to uncover a crime.96 The police therefore, will usually be acting 
reasonably so long as they have a good reason to believe the subject is engaging in 
criminal activity. With intelligence agencies, their reason for surveillance will probably 
be national security; it would take a bold judiciary to question the validity of this 
justification.97 
If the victim of the video surveillance can satisfy all these elements, they can gain two 
kinds of remedy under the BORA. Firstly, if the police charge the subject with a crime 
they may ask the court to exclude the video surveillance evidence,98 or alternatively, they 
may claim damages from the Crown. 99 
Apart from the limitation in section 3, the BORA probably provides the public with some 
protection against home video surveillance. That courts have generally found video 
surveillance reasonable is, however, a major shortcoming, especially since they have not 
identified the basis for the reasonable belief that someone is committing a crime. In 
addition, despite comments to the contrary, '00 it seems the courts are judging 
reasonableness on whether the police successfully uncover criminal activity; that is that 
the police can use video surveillance providing they in fact uncover a crime . 
Nevertheless, the BORA may protect people from some government use of home video 
surveillance, but in my opinion, more protection is required . 
94 Fraser, above n 86,452; Grayson, above n 84,407 . 
95 Grayson, above n 84, 400. 
96 Grayson, above n 84, 401 "suspicion of criminal activity"; Fraser, above n 86, 453 "suspected of 
involvement in drug dealing"; Gardiner, above n 18 , 1144 had good reason to think they were committing 
serious offenses. 
97 If, however, the police or intelligence agency clearly had no reason to believe the subject of the 
surveillance was involved in either a crime or a threat to national security, the court may find their conduct 
to be unreasonable. Such a situation may arise if the police or intelligence agency were conducting 
surveillance upon the wrong person (See generally: Simpson v Attorney General (Baigent 's Case} [1994] 3 
NZLR 667, 703 (CA)). In my opinion, however, the court would not define surveillance as unreasonable if 
the agency had a bona fide belief it was for national security purposes. 
98 R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 (CA) . 
99 Baigent's Case, above n 97, 703. This remedy however, wilt probably only be available to those who the 
police never charged with a crime 
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III EXTENDING PROTECTION 
So far, this paper has shown that the public needs protection from home video 
surveillance, but all the existing laws have serious shortcomings when applied to this 
situation. This part, however, will suggest a solution to this problem. Firstly, this part 
decides whether Parliament or the courts should have the task of prohibiting home video 
surveillance. Secondly, this part analyses the United State's tort of intrusion upon 
solitude and determines whether it covers such surveillance. Thirdly, this part creates, 
and discusses a preliminary formulation of law, with reference to the situation in the 
United States, that would prohibit home video surveillance . 
A Legislation or Common Law? 
A major issue is whether it should be the courts, or Parliament, who prohibit home video 
surveillance. McGechan J in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd believed that 
parliamentary intervention into the privacy issue would be the preferable approach, 101 and 
in relation to home video surveillance, the passage of legislation certainly has many 
benefits. Firstly, As Lord Buckmaster stated in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson, 102 the 
courts cannot simply make new law; if New Zealand desires a new law, its creation rests 
with Parliament, not the courts. 103 Secondly, legislation would be reasonably efficient in 
providing a clear prohibition on this issue. Conversely, the judiciary has to develop the 
common law on a case-by-case basis and it would take time for the courts to develop a 
tort that clearly prohibited home video surveillance. 104 As an example, it took the courts 
fourteen years to acknowledge the public disclosure of private facts tort in P v Dafter the 
100 Fraser, above n 86, 452. 
'
0
' Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [ 1986) 2 NZLR 716 (HC). 733. 
'
02 McA/ister ( or Donoghue) ( Pauper) v Stevenson [ 1932) AC 562 (HL). 
'
03 Although New Zealand does have a public disclosure of private facts tort and McGechan Jin Tucker, 
above n IOI, 716, 731, 733 did made some comments suggesting that the privacy tort could extend to 
intrusion. In addition, Rosemary Tobin argues that a tort for intentional intrusion may already exist (Tobin, 
above n 46, 133), but she does not go into much detail concerning this point. 
104 
John Burrows "Invasion of Privacy" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3 ed , 
Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2001) 908,936 . 
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Tucker case raised it in 1986. In addition, if Parliament do not intervene, there is 
uncertainty as to whether the courts will even decide to extend the privacy tort and if they 
do, what form it will take. 105 
A judicial development of the privacy tort, however, may be preferable to a legislative 
approach. Firstly, all previous legislative intervention into the privacy arena has, in short, 
been unsatisfactory. This paper has discussed in detail the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority Privacy Principles, the Privacy Act 1993, the Harassment Act 1997 and the 
BORA. This paper has also referred to the Summary Offences Act 1981 and the P1ivate 
Investigators and Security Guards Act 1974. All this legislation, although not directly 
aimed at home video surveillance, encounters problems when applied to this situation . 
This is because legislation is quickly outdated when it attempts to monitor an area, such 
as privacy, that is highly influenced by technology. 106 Therefore, if Parliament did pass 
legislation prohibiting home video surveillance, further advances in technology may soon 
make the legislation redundant. Conversely, common law torts are much more flexible 
and have an ability to change to meet the needs of society. 107 In addition, common law 
development by the courts will be able to take account of new privacy issues as they arise 
and alter the law as society advances. 108 
Overall , the best approach is not obvious, but there is a good middle ground. This would 
be for Parliament to pass legislation that dealt with intrusions into p1ivacy in a broad 
manner. More specifically, the legislation would have to take a form similar to that of 
common law torts, but obviously with certain guidelines. Such legislation would deal 
with most of the problems raised above relating to the creation of legislation or common 
law in this area. Namely, Parliament could create it reasonably quickly, it would remove 
the uncertainty of judicially created law and the guidelines would help the courts interpret 
105 
Burrows, above n 104, 936. Also note the way the courts interpreted principle III of the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority Privacy Principles . 
106 See: Warren and Brandeis, above n 4, 195. 
107 
For example, in the 1815 case of Pickering v Rudd (1815) 4 CAMP 219 it was doubtful whether trespass 
into airspace was encompassed by the tort of trespass to land. By 1927, however, the case of Davies v 
Bennison (1927) 22 Tasmania LR 52 clearly accepted that airspace was included . 
108 Burrows, above n 104, 936 . 
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the legislation how Parliament intended. In addition, the broad principles would be able 
to deal with technology and societal advancements better than specific legislation since 
they would be subject to a degree of judicial development if needed. Ultimately therefore, 
if drafted well, this legislation would provide the public with protection against home 
video surveillance. The issue remains , however, about what form this tort-like legislation 
should take. In resolving this issue, New Zealand would have to look to a jurisdiction that 
has formulated their law in such a way as to prohibit home video surveillance . 
B United States 
Cunently there are four recognised pnvacy torts m the United States. 109 For present 
purposes, however, only intrusion into the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude is directly 
relevant. This tort has three elements: (a) the defendant must have committed an 
intrusion ; (b) this intrusion must be highly offensive to the plaintiff; and (c) the intrusion 
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 11 0 This paper will now detennine to 
what extent this tort covers home video surveillance . 
In relation to the first element, the courts must class home video surveillance as an 
intrusion. Yet, as this paper has shown , commonly someone using video surveillance will 
not physically enter another's private area. United States courts have recognised this , 
however, and have classed video surveillance as a non-physical intrusion, which is still 
an intrusion for the purposes of this tort .111 For example, in Pemberton v Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation the court held that a surveillance device on the plaintiff's motel door was an 
intrusion . 11 2 Similarly, the court in Harkey v Abate found that surveillance of a restroom 
109 
Charl es Morgan "Employer Monitoring of Employee Electro nic Mail and Internet use" (1999) 44 
McGill LJ 849 , 856. These are (a) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or so litude, or into his pri vate 
affairs; (b) Public di sc losure of embarrass ing pri vate fac ts; (c) Public ity which places the plaintiff in a fa lse 
light in the public eye; and (d) Appropri ation, fo r the defendant 's advantage, of the plainti ffs name or 
likeness (Prosser, above n 2, 107). See also : David A Elder The Law of Privacy (Lawyers Cooperative 
Publishing, New York, 1991 ) 
110 Elder, above n 109, 17 
111 Elder, abo ve n 109, 34, 41. 
11 2 
Pemberton v Bethlehem Steel Corporation (1986) 479 US 984 . 
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was an intrusion. 113 Overall, United States courts have decided that any video 
surveillance will satisfy the intrusion element of this tort. 114 In addition, the defendant 
must also intend to intrude upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude. 115 
Secondly, the defendant's intrusion must be highly offensive to the plaintiff. As this is a 
subjective element, whether it is satisfied will depend upon each case. The United States 
courts, however, generally look at the degree of the intrusion, the surrounding 
circumstances, the purpose of the intrusion and the plaintiff's privacy expectations. 11 6 
The courts look to these factors to ascertain whether the plaintiff was actually highly 
offended by the intrusion. Nevertheless , since this is the subjective element of the tort, 
the plaintiff' s complaint will normally suffice . 
The fact that the intrusion must also have been highly offensive to a reasonable person is 
the main method the United States courts use to control the scope of this tort. This 
element, however, involves many separate issues . 
Firstly, a plaintiff will normally not be able to prove a breach if the intrusions are 
offensive without being highly offensive, but this distinction is sometimes difficult to 
make. The main object of this element of the tort, however, is to prevent people being 
able to sue for intrusions that are merely trivial or annoying. 11 7 The court in N.O.C 
Incorporated v Schaefer stated that someone using moderate surveillance to record 
suspected illegal dumping was not highly offensive. 11 8 In addition , the court in Dempsey 
v National Enquirer found that the defendant's continual attempts to photograph the 
plaintiff were merely annoying. 11 9 Overall , however, the view of the United States courts 
is that home video surveillance will be more than a trivial intrusion. 120 
113 
Harkey v Abate (1983) 346 NW 2d 74 (Mich App 1983). 
11 4 Morgan, above n 109, 869 . 
11 5 Elder, above n 109, 23. 
11 6 Morgan, above n 109, 869 . 
117 Elder,above n 109, 17 , 18,2 1. 
11 8 
N.O.C lnco1porated v Schaef er (1984) 484 A 2d 729 (NJ, 1984). 
119 
Dempsey v National Enquirer (1988) 702 F Supp 927 (DC Me, 1988) . 
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Secondly, the plaintiff nonnally has to show a pattern of intrusive conduct. United States 
case law, however, has created an exception to this by finding that a single act of filming 
or taking a picture will be enough. 121 In my opinion, there is no reason why a United 
States court would treat a single act of video surveillance any differently. With video 
surveillance therefore, whether the intrusion was singular instead of continual will not be 
fatal to the plaintiff's case under this tort. The courts, however, may be more likely to 
class continual home video surveillance as highly offensive . 
In addition, if the defendant has legal authority for committing the intrusion, a United 
States court will not find the act highly offensive to a reasonable person. 122 For example, 
if the police are subjecting someone to surveillance in their home, so long as they have a 
warrant or some other legal authority, they will not have breached this tort. This means 
the tort will not prevent effective law enforcement or other lawful acts so long as the 
people using the surveillance have fulfilled their own legal requirements . 
Despite these exceptions, the common view m the United States is that home video 
surveillance will usually satisfy this element of the tort. This is because in p1ivate areas 
such as the home, one has a reasonable expectation of privacy and any intrusion into this 
private sphere by video surveillance would be highly offensive to any reasonable 
person. 123 
The final aspect of the United States invasion of solitude tort that this paper will discuss 
is the possibility that someone may consent to privacy invasions. 124 This may be express 
or implied and, if the person's consent exists at the time of the privacy invasion, it 
neutralises any liability under the tort. Overall, the main point of this is that all people 
120 S ee: Pe111berto11 , above n 112,984; Harkey, above n 113, 74. 
121 Elder, above n 109, 19 . 
122 Elder, above n 109, 20. 
123 
See: Pemberton, above n 112, 984; Harkey, above n 113, 74; Elder, above n 109, 41-44; Morgan, above 
n 109, 869. 
124 
Elder, above n 109, 68; Elizabeth Paton-Simpson "Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection 
of Privacy in Public Places" (2000) 50 U Toronto LJ 305, 311. 
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consent to some privacy invasions. 125 When someone ventures into public especially, he 
or she generally consents to a high degree of privacy invasion from other people. 126 The 
case of International Union v Garner concerned the police and others using surveillance 
to record the license plate numbers of people at union meetings. They then traced the 
numbers, discovered the people's identities and informed each of their employers that 
they were at the meetings. The court stated that there was no privacy invasion because the 
car numbers were in public view and therefore they had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 127 This at first seems to have no direct relevance to home video surveillance. If 
however, someone is in their home and people outside that area can observe them easily, 
the courts will find that they consented to any video surveillance intrusion that views the 
same acts as the people outside. 128 Concerning home video surveillance therefore, the 
United States tort of invasion of solitude will not apply if the surveillance only sees what 
is already in the public view . 
Therefore, home video surveillance is an intrusion that is normally highly offensive to 
both the subject and a reasonable person. Consequently, so long as the video surveillance 
does not merely observe that which is already in the public view, in the United States 
there is an obvious tort prohibiting home video surveillance. When formulating broad 
tort-like legislation therefore , this paper, and Parliament, should have specific regard to 
the United States experience . 
C A Preliminary Formulation 
In my opm1on, the New Zealand Parliament should create broad legislation to cover 
intrusions into people ' s privacy, which would in tum prohibit home video surveillance. In 
doing so, they should have regard to the law in the United States. Therefore, any intrusion 
upon someone's privacy that would be highly offensive and objectionable to a person of 
ordinary sensibilities in the plaintiff's position would breach the legislation . The courts 
125 Elder, above n 109, 68 . 
126 See: Paton-Simpson, above n 124, 313. 
127 
lnteniationa/ Union v Garner (1985) 601 F Supp 187 (MD Tenn 1985) . 
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should also have to determine under the legislation whether the public interest in not 
punishing the intrusion in each situation clearly outweighs the plaintiff's privacy rights . 
D Elements of the Preliminary Formulation 
I Intrusion 
Firstly, the defendant must have committed an intrusion. This is virtually identical to the 
United States tort in that this law will expressly remedy the intrusion. This is especially 
relevant when applied to home video surveillance. For example, if someone used 
surveillance to record the private acts of another but did not watch the recording, they 
will have still committed an intrusion. This law therefore, should remedy the actual 
. . h h' f h . 129 intrusion, not t e watc mg o t e pnvate acts . 
In addition, this element does not, and should not, require the perpetrator to have the 
intention to intrude upon someone's privacy. The reason for this is simply that intrusion 
upon someone's solitude can occur without intent. For example, take the situation of 
someone that places their video camera on a table but accidentally leaves it running on 
zoom-mode. Unfortunately, the camera records another person carrying out private 
activities which nobody would be able to see without using a zoom lens. Although these 
occunences, and even unintentional intrusions upon privacy, are unlikely to arise often, it 
is possible. The point is that even with unintentional intrusions, the perpetrator has still 
invaded someone's privacy and in my opinion that person is entitled to redress. In these 
situations therefore, although the victim will not need an injunction, they should be 
entitled to damages as a remedy for the privacy invasion. 130 
128 Elder, above n 109, 36. 
129 
Of course, this may influence the quantum of damages. The courts, however, should not let a lack of 
watching affect the damages too much given it is the intrusion that the tort is attempting to remedy. 
130 
There is an argument, however, that this results in the broad legislation imposing strict liability, which 
may be going too far. More discussion is clearly needed on this point. 
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2 Intrusion upon privacy 
Secondly, instead of "intruding upon someone's solitude", 131 in my opinion the wording 
should be "intruding upon someone's privacy." 132 The difference this makes is that the 
aspect of another's life someone is intruding upon must be private. This simplifies the 
United States formulation in that the idea of consent does not arise. More specifically, 
instead of the courts having to state that people consent to some privacy intrusions in 
public places, all they would have to determine is whether the intrusion was upon an act 
that society should deem as private. For example, if a couple is engaged in intimate acts 
in a public market and someone takes a photo, 133 this would not be an intrusion upon 
their privacy because they are conducting their affairs in public view. The act therefore, is 
not private. In contrast, if a couple is acting the same in their bedroom away from public 
scrutiny, the act will be private. Anyone using techniques to photograph this will be 
intruding upon their privacy. 
An important issue that arises from this element is what Parliament or the courts will 
define as private. Namely, they may distinguish between acts that occur in public as 
opposed to those that someone can-ies out within their private property, or even those acts 
that occur in someone's garden as opposed to their bedroom. 134 There is no certain way to 
determine how Parliament should decide this issue, but it seems that if an aspect of 
someone ' s life is not readily in public view, it will be private. 135 Commonly, therefore, 
someone using home video surveillance will be intruding upon the subject's privacy. 
131 Elder, above n 109, 16. 
132 See: Paton-Simpson, above n 124, 310. 
133 Gill v Hearst Publishing Company (1953) 253 P 2d 441 (Cal 1953). 
134 See: Fraser, above n 86, 453; the court stated that "reasonable expectations of privacy for activities 
readily in visible from outside the property (in this case the garden) must be significantly less than ... for 
activities within buildings." 
135 S ee: Fraser, above n 86,453; Grayson, above n 84,407. 
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3 Highly offensive and objectionable 
Thirdly, this formulation adopts the wording of "highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities" which is identical to the public disclosure of 
private facts tort. 136 This wording is also analogous to the United States expression, but 
the reason for adopting the phrase used in the New Zealand tort is merely to keep the 
general law of privacy as simple as possible. 
4 Public interest 
Finally, the above formulation also includes the public interest element that Nicholson J 
added to the public disclosure of private facts tort. 137 In my opinion, it important to 
include this element to allow certain intrusions upon someone's privacy. For example, the 
police conducting surveillance of someone's home under the authority of a warrant would 
be in the public interest, and would outweigh the subject's privacy rights. The courts, 
however, would have to use this element sparingly to ensure the new law remains 
effective and, as stated above, the public interest must clearly outweigh the plaintiff's 
privacy rights . 
If Parliament did create broad legislation as this paper has suggested, New Zealanders 
would have a great deal more protection from home video surveillance. In addition, this 
would prohibit the actual surveillance intrusion, not the trespass, the nuisance, the 
disclosure, the harassment, the collection or the unreasonable search. All the laws Part II 
discussed may provide the public with some protection, but in effect using these laws is a 
makeshift approach to an issue that is highly relevant in New Zealand and requires its 
own law . 
136 P v D, above n 15,601. 
137 P v D, above n 15,601. 
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IV CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that pnvacy is a fundamental right in New Zealand and is 
deserving of protection. An aspect of this is the right to be free from the video 
surveillance of your home. Technology, however, has meant that home video surveillance 
is a greater threat than ever before and is a very real problem. Despite this, existing laws 
in New Zealand do not clearly and effectively protect the public from such surveillance . 
This paper has examined seven such laws and has shown that they all have serious 
shortcomings. Nevertheless, the United States has developed a tort that provides effective 
protection for the public from home video surveillance: this being the tort of intrusion 
upon solitude . 
In my opinion, the New Zealand Parliament should create broad legislation with 
guidelines , having specific regard to the present United State's Jaw of intrusion upon 
solitude. This paper has also provided a preliminary formulation of the Jaw that would be 
applicable to the New Zealand situation. Despite the current lack of protection against 
home video surveillance therefore, Parliament should make changes in the future. If 
Parliament did create new law along the lines of what this paper has suggested, New 
Zealanders would finally have legal recourse against those who implement home video 
surveillance and personal privacy would finally get the protection it deserves . 
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